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Outline
• The economic environment of the incumbent
• Regulating for earlier (more) investment when the
firm chooses the amount of its investment
• Regulating the incumbent when it is forced to supply.
– Traditional rate of return regulation
– Incentive regulation
• Conclusions
Economic background
• Networks: high proportion of cost are sunk:
equivalently much investment is irreversible
• Future network costs are uncertain
• Future demand/surplus (welfare) is uncertain
• Modern regulation seeks to facilitate competition
yielding prospective demand uncertainty
Regulation and the incumbent
• Regulation seeks to induce:
- Financial viability
i.e. the expected net return from investment should not be
negative
- Lowest cost provision
- Replacement cost or
- Historical cost
- The right timing (quantity) of investment
• Incumbent firm may under regulation
- Choose the timing of investment
- Have its timing constrained
Regulation when the firm chooses
investment timing  1
• Applicable to an extent in all regulation: asymmetric information:
eg maintenance
• Regulator seeks to induce a monopoly to invest earlier (more)
• In “Regulation, Investment Timing, and the Choice of Rate Base”
(www.iscr.org.nz) which has
– Uncertainty about the total of consumer and producer benefits
– Uncertainty about future network costs
– Irreversible investment
– The regulator choosing historical or replacement cost rate base
– An incumbent with no competition
we reach the following conclusions
Regulation when the firm chooses
investment timing  2
• Generally the regulator seeks earlier investment
• Variation in demand and cost really matters with irreversible
investment
• Whether replacement cost or historical cost is desirable depends
on the industry
– Little variation in costs suggests preference for replacement cost
– Much variation in cost, and cost declines associated with increased
consumer benefits, suggest preference for historical cost
• Using the historical cost base can induce earlier investment than
the unregulated firm would make
• The appropriate allowed rate of return is higher with replacement
(vs historical) cost and generally higher than the WACC
• Setting the allowed rate of return too low leads to very substantial
reductions in consumer benefits as compared to setting it too high
Regulation when the firm is forced to
supply
• The firm has no options: must supply
• Future demand is uncertain (uncertain cost will also
matter)
• Regulation
– Seeks financial viability & lowest cost
– May be Rate-of-return or Incentive Regulation
The set up
– First we consider reversible investment  (second irreversibility)
– capacity S≥X demand or customers: forced investment
– Pt is the price of the network at time t
– r is the (systematic) risk adjusted required rate of return
– R is net revenue
– Suppress depreciation
How much “profit” is “reasonable”?
Required to supply:reversible
“Traditional” regulation: Revenue based on historical cost
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 i.e   Revenue Requirement = rate of return times cost at the 
          beginning of the period
How much profit is “reasonable”?
Required to supply: reversible
Revenue Requirement =
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rate of return times cost at the beginning
of the period, adjusted for expected
capital gain or loss over the period
“Incentive” regulation
Revenue based on replacement cost
Irreversibility
Required to supply
• Capacity
- Can never fall
- Grows when required to meet demand
• Leads to stranding
• Distinguish between capacity and demand (number
of subscribers): 
i.e. Capacity (S) at least Demand (X)
Adjusting the capacity of the regulated
network under irreversibility when demand
must be served
Capacity
Demand
Time
• Typical volatility in “business as usual demand”
• Telecom NZ Ltd (residential customer numbers)
- Average growth rate: 1.5%
- Std dev growth rate: 6.1%
• Electricity distribution networks (total traffic)
- Average growth rate: 2.0%
- Std dev growth rate: 4.5%
Demand volatility
Reasonable returns when costs are
sunk when required to supply
Revenue Requirement
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Revenue requirement is historical cost times the risk
adjusted rate adjusted for expected capital gains/losses
resulting from price and/or demand reductions
Reasonable returns when costs are
sunk when required to supply
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• Depend upon the future
• “Reasonable” allowed rate of return depends on
- Systematic risk (in profit and replacement cost)
- Uncertainty in technology and prices
- Uncertainty in demand
• Lowest cost of “what”?
• Allowed rate of return on “what”?
Reasonable returns when costs are
sunk when required to supply
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which may be much above r
Allowed rate of return =
Our approach
“Asset Stranding is Inevitable in Competitive Markets”
(www.iscr.org.nz)
• Demand evolves with (potential) trend and volatility
• Regulation requires:
- Financial viability
- Lowest cost provider given existing customers
• Traditional regulation
- Existing customers pay for capacity
• Incentive regulation
- Connected customers pay fixed fee
Results
• Traditional regulation
- Customers absorb the risk
- Prices vary over time
- Reasonable return may be as low as risk-free rate
• Incentive regulation
- Firm absorbs the risk
- Prices constant over time: allows firm-price long-
term contracts
- Reasonable return typically exceeds risk-free rate
• Welfare
- Incentive regulation exceeds that of Traditional
regulation
Reasonable rates of return
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•   Risk-free rate is 5%
•   No systematic risk
* i.e. tilted annuity adds 2%
Examples
• Telecom NZ Ltd (residential customer numbers)
- Average growth rate: 1.5%,Std dev growth rate: 6.1%
- Reasonable rate of return requires 50 basis point
premium
• Electricity distribution networks (total traffic)
- Average growth rate: 2.0%, Std dev growth rate: 4.5%
- Reasonable rate of return requires 24 basis point
premium
• Mixture of technologies
1. Flexible, but expensive
2. Inflexible, but cheap
• E.g. mobile generation and maintenance
• Network configuration can be used to manage
future demand risk
Network configuration
Adjusting network composition
over time
Threshold for
investing in fixed
network
Capacity of fixed
network
Demand
Reversible Investment
Time
Regulation and network configuration
• Traditional regulation
- Either
- All flexible technology
- Or all inflexible technology
• Incentive regulation
- Optimal mixture of two technologies
- Information requirements differ
Conclusion: when firm must supply
• Summary
ß Traditional regulation:
̶Inefficient risk allocation
̶Inefficient investment
̶Low required rate of return
ß Incentive regulation
̶Efficient risk allocation
̶Efficient investment
̶Higher required rate of return
Conclusion
• Regulation involves both encouraging the timing of
investment and seeking that where investment is
forced the firm is just financially viable and low cost
• Variation in demand is part of the businesses and it
can be substantially increased by competition
• Both imply that uncertainty and variation matter for
risk and that specific risks importantly raise allowed
rates of return above WACC even if no regulatory risk
is present:
• The WACC is but an element of the investment
decision and thus the allowed rate of return
                
                  
                  
 
